Hamas 1.4 - Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Operation Breaking Dawn and Operation Shield and Arrow

Hamas is not the only terrorist organization in Gaza, The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, commonly known simply as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is an Islamist paramilitary organization formed in 1981 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and was influenced ideologically in its formation by Iran, and whose objective is the establishment of a sovereign Islamic Palestinian state.

PIJ calls for the military destruction of Israel. The organization's financial backing has historically come mainly from Syria and Hezbollah. Since 2014, PIJ has seen its power steadily increase with the backing of funds from Iran. The armed wing of PIJ is Al-Quds Brigades, which is active in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with its main strongholds in the cities of Hebron and Jenin.

The aim of PIJ is the establishment of a sovereign, Islamic Palestinian state within the

geographic borders of pre-1948 Mandatory Palestine. Completely rejecting the political process, the organization professes that its goals can only be achieved through military means.

In a 2002 book, Yonah Alexander wrote that PIJ calls for the destruction of Israel, rejects the optionof a peaceful settlement with Israel, and advocates the use of guerrilla tactics to achieve that aim. Israel’s eradication is viewed as an essential prerequisite for addressing the challenges facing the Muslim world. It envisions laying the groundwork for a future scenario in which a significant Islamic Arabic army engages in military confrontation to achieve Israel's destruction. The PIJ has been accountable for some of the deadliest suicide attacks in Israel.- Alexander, Yonah (1 January 2002). Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad

For the purposes of this discussion it is important to examine the two latest confrontations

between Israel and PIJ, Operation Breaking Dawn (August 2022) and Operation Shield and

Arrow (May 2023).

Operation Breaking Dawn was a three-day Israeli military operation targeting Palestinian

Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in the Gaza Strip, lasting from the afternoon of Friday, August 5 to the night of Sunday, August 7. It consisted of Israeli airstrikes on PIJ military and personnel targets in the Gaza Strip, to which PIJ responded by launching rockets at Israeli cities.

The goal of the operation was to weaken PIJ’s capabilities in order to prevent the terror

organization from carrying out an attack against Israel, along with re-establishing Israeli

deterrence. According to Israeli intelligence, PIJ was planning to use anti-tank missiles and

snipers to target Israeli civilians near the Gaza border.

Hamas did not participate in the conflict. Israel refrained from provoking Hamas in order to prevent a larger-scale war, while Hamas had no desire to hamper Gaza reconstruction or its own efforts to renew its capabilities following the May 2021 conflict.

Operation Shield and Arrow could be described as one of the most successful operations of the IDF and the Shin Bet in Gaza according to YNET News. "Palestinian Islamic Jihad took perhaps the hardest it had ever experienced when fighting against Israel. It lost most of its leadership in targeted killings when the fighting began, losing even more as the operation continued". -https://www.ynetnews.com/article/ry00hflre2

This conflict also saw Hamas sitting on the sideline. The Israeli media praised the successes of the IDF and viewed Hamas’ reluctance to participate in the fighting as a positive step after the beating that Hamas endured in May 2021.

A difference between journalism and history is that history can view a situation in its

entirety while journalism is myopic most of the time, simply because it does not have all

the facts.

In an analysis titled “Hamas’ Balancing Act vis a vis Israel”, by Jehad Abusalim of The Jerusalem Fund/Palestine Centre, written in July 2023, Mr. Abusalim discusses why Hamas decided not to engage the IDF in the last two “operations”.

“Crucially, in both instances Hamas—the largest faction in the Gaza Strip with the

most substantial military capabilities—refrained from directly engaging in the conflict,”

he states.

“Hamas appears to be strategically conserving its resources for a potentially larger

confrontation with Israel in the future. Hamas’s choices have critical consequences

for Gaza and beyond. Israel, which is capable of inflicting significant damage on

Gaza, including large-scale losses of life and the destruction of crucial infrastructure,

is now cautiously considering any potential confrontation with Hamas. This wariness

is born not just of the potential humanitarian cost but also of Hamas’s growing military

capacity to target Israeli points of interest beyond the armistice line.”

“Israeli author Shai Feldman has argued that, contrary to claims by Israeli

commanders, Israel did not achieve a strategic defeat of Hamas or manage to

suppress its rocket attacks in the 2021 fighting. Essentially, Israel’s deterrence

capacity suffered a significant blow in 2021, a fact that has been noted by

Palestinians as well."

"Alternatively, it could signify a strategic choice by Hamas, which may be

choosing to conserve its resources and capabilities in preparation for what its

leadership perceives as potentially more significant battles in the future.”-

https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/hamass-balancing-act-vis-a-vis-israel

In an analysis for The Times of Israel, written by Lazar Berman in May 2021 titled, “”Iron

Dome Has Saved Many Lives, but Has It Made Israel Safer?” he writes,

“Imagine for a moment that the Iron Dome was never developed. Israel would face two possible principal approaches to the Gaza question. It could seek a political solution with Hamas through the mediation of Egypt and other third parties, or it could embark on a decisive ground campaign in an attempt to rid Israelis of the rocket threat from Gaza once and for all. For much of Israel’s history, its concept against sophisticated terrorist networks rested on ground raids and larger operations, and it often succeeded, including against the PLO in southern Lebanon in 1982 and Palestinian groups in the West Bank in 2002. Such an operation in Gaza would undoubtedly be costly in blood and treasure in the short term, and would necessitate some sort of longer-term Israeli presence or arrangement to introduce PA security forces, but could potentially bring a solution to the Hamas threat.”

“Israel has been through four rounds of elections over the past two years, and none of them

featured any debate about what to do about Gaza, an issue on which Benjamin Netanyahu,

prime minister for the entirety of the Iron Dome era, would be vulnerable.”

“Until it (Iron Dome) is integrated into a concept alongside the IDF’s offensive might, and a

political approach that at the very least broaches a long-term solution to the Gaza challenge, it (Iron Dome) can only provide temporary shelter for Israeli civilians while dangers continue to multiply just across the borders.” - https://www.timesofisrael.com/iron-dome-has-saved-many-lives-but-has-it-made-israel-safer

Both Jehad Abusalim and Lazar Berman were quite prescient about Hamas’ strategy and the looming danger to Israel.